11 DLI at Cambrai 30 November 1917 (part 2)

HQ and ‘C’ Company were in Gouzeaucourt. Nothing very unusual was noticed except fairly heavy gun fire from about 6 AM onwards. About 8 AM, Gouzeaucourt was being shelled a certain amount, but it did not seem heavy enough to cause uneasiness. About 9.15 AM the CO noticed Garrison Artillery men and odd people rushing about excitedly and horses galloping in the direction of Fins. A rumour came down that the Germans had broken through. The Signalling Sergeant telephoned to Divisional HQ who reported everything OK. Just then heavy machine gun fire was heard close to Village and bullets were coming through. The CO then asked a Sergeant Major of the RA [Royal Artillery] what was the matter and he reported that the enemy was coming over in masses from the direction of VILLERS-GUISLAIN. Every man fell in at once, and the CO led them out in the direction of Hill 135 about 500 yards SW of Gouzeaucourt. The CO, who went up on the Hill then saw the Germans advancing in the most perfect order with absolutely no opposition of any kind. They were also sweeping the crest of Hill 135 with machine gun fire from QUENTIN RIDGE. The first waves of hostile infantry were then across the railway, and the others were in force on the QUENTIN RIDGE. There was a line of our infantry retiring South Westward on Chapel Hill being followed up by the German Infantry. The CO ordered platoon to fight the houses in the southern end of Gouzeaucourt to cover this left flank. Two platoons were placed along HEUDICOURT-GOUZEAUCOURT road in W6a to check the hostile advance from QUENTIN RIDGE, and the remaining platoon was sent over further to the right to about W5d central to protect the right flank which was open. The men were well led by Lt Bushell. About 3 sections of Royal Engineers under Major Robinson then came and were ordered two sections to reinforce the left flank and one section to fill in the gap between Hill 135 and the platoon on the right. There was great confusion, troops of all kinds pouring down the Fins road in a blind panic, also many standing about doing nothing. Major Robinson, whose men were ignorant of open warfare training handled his men with great coolness and courage. The machine gun fire was by now very heavy indeed and hostile machine guns were now enfilading from the south. The enemy’s infantry had broken through the village of Gouzeaucourt and were also firing from the houses. The platoon sent there had been unable to hold up the hostile advance, as the German Infantry was already in the houses when they got there and there was indescribable confusion. The CO ordered Sergeant Major McEvoy to take 20 men at once and place them in the old Brown Line south of the GOUZEAUCOURT-FINS road at about W4b.85 and to hold that to the last man. This party would also cover retirement of others. The remainder of the Company and the RE then got back to the Brown Line under heavy machine gun fire from GOUZEAUCOURT and Hill 135 and from the Ridge south of this.

There was a certain amount of confusion due to the surprise, heavy fire and lack of training, but the party reached the Brown Line and was rallied here astride the main road. Here every man was collected and put into the trench. Lt Symms of the 27th Siege Battery, RA, rendered splendid service in rallying men and in organising a defence. He had fought his Howitzers until the enemy was almost on him and then after rendering his guns useless, joined the mixed party of ‘C’ Company and RE. He was extremely cool throughout. The casualties under the circumstances were very light due to the bad shooting of the Germans. When the party formed up in the Brown Line the enemy seemed to come in very cautiously and pushed patrols out, which, when fired on, returned. He made a slight effort to reach the Brown Line south of the road, but this was easily repulsed. The CO sent an urgent message to SOREL for machine guns and ammunition; the Adjutant, Captain Tollitt, also went down to explain situation. At 12.10 PM, the CO and Lt Symms went along the Brown Line in the direction of Queen’s Cross, leaving Major Lloyd (who had sprained his ankle) in temporary charge near the main road. Lt Symms collected stragglers and placed them astride the METZ-GOUZEAUCOURT road. By this time the local rout showed signs of checking.

The 20th Hussars reinforced and occupied the Brown Line on the south of the existing Line. The party in the Brown Line was a mixed party of about 250 rifles. The CO of the 20th Hussars then came over and conferred with the CO of the Battalion and offered assistance with Hotchkiss guns. As the 2nd Coldstreams were now coming up in support, these were not needed. The 2nd Coldstreams in the early afternoon came through in the most perfect order and counter-attacked. The CO did not push the mixed party forward with the Guards as they would have hindered them more than helped them. About 16 men of ‘C’ Company on the right of the road attached themselves to the dismounted cavalry and advanced with them.

The lack of training was very noticeable though on the whole the men were willing and steady when collected by an officer. The shooting was wild in the extreme. If ‘C’ Company had had Lewis guns, the German casualties would have been very heavy. Lt Bushell commanding ‘C’ Company showed conspicuous coolness and courage throughout. Lt Freeman, who was killed early on, also showed great gallantry.

Casualties, ‘C’ Company and HQ:

1 officer killed

1 officer wounded (slightly)

6 OR killed

34 OR wounded

The RE lost more heavily in proportion to numbers engaged. The chaplain, the Rev HP Walton went out with ‘C’ Company and rendered excellent service to the wounded under heavy direct machine gun and rifle fire. He also collected stragglers and brought them back to the Brown Line. The Adjutant, who had returned to the Orderly Room after having been out on the Hill with the CO, managed to get the confidential papers and made his own escape, He was sent to SOREL for machine guns and reinforcements for the Brown Line and then returned.


11 DLI at Cambrai 30 November 1917 (part 1)

On the night of 29-30 November 1917, ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies were out on overnight work road building. As they returned in the morning, they became heavily embroiled in dealing with the German counter-attack after the initial success of the Cambrai offensive. What follows is the account that found its way into the Battalion War Diary, more or less word for word. I have not commented on it, as it speaks for itself. Suffice to say that it is a measured and apparently objective description of the role played by Lt Colonel Hayes and his company commanders and their sense of initiative in confusing circumstances when the men would have been tired. There are a large number of map references, so if the reader has access to a contemporary trench map they will be able to pin point where each Company was. I have divided the account into two parts, the first covering the working parties and the second covering Hayes and the HQ with ’C’ Company.



On the 30th, the Battalion was situated as follows: ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies in the Hindenburg support line near R.4.a.26.; ‘A’ Company in shelters in the Railway Cutting at VILLERS PLOUICH; HQ and ‘C’ Company in shelters in sunken road in Gouzeaucourt in Q.16.a.

‘B’ Company were out on the night 29/30 digging trench at cemetery strong point NW of Rue des Vignes. Whilst returning to trenches in R4 a heavy hostile barrage dropped about.

AM: about 6.45 AM it was reported to the company commander Captain Jee that large bodies of men were retiring in a disorderly manner. Captain Jee stood to at once, and two platoons took up a defensive position at R4a33 in the sunken road. Two platoons at R3a.6.0, in support to front two platoons, and to bar the enemy from working up MARCOING VALLEY. Captain Jee reported to Brigadier General Banbury, 61st Infantry Brigade, who ordered him to hold the trench leaving sunken road at R4.a.3.6 with two platoons. The remaining two were to stay where they were. This position lasted till 5.30 PM, during which time fire was opened on several occasions on the enemy. Hostile aeroplanes were very harassing during this period. At 5.30 PM the Company then joined ‘D’ Company in the trench at R.9.b.5.8. Casualties: 1 officer wounded (severely), 3 OR killed and 6 OR wounded.

‘D’ Company under Captain Pemberton were in trench at R9.b.5.8. After the hostile bombardment had been on for some time, Captain Pemberton observed men coming back from the front line who said that the Germans had broken through. The company stood to and took up a position in the Hindenburg Line about R.9.d facing NE. The company commander then received a message from Major Morgan Owen, 11th Rifle Brigade, addressed to 7th DCLI asking for reinforcements on his left, so Captain Pemberton at once advanced to the trench running from R3d.9.1 to R10a.35 and established touch with the 11th Rifle Brigade on his right. He then reported personally to Brigadier General Banbury who ordered him to get in touch with 7th KOYLI in front and to withdraw the remainder of his company in support. Captain Pemberton went along the front line from the 11th Rifle Brigade to the 7th KOYLI and established touch and gradually withdrew ‘D’ Company as 7th KOYLI took over more line. This was complete by 5.30 PM.

‘A’ Company under Captain Sear MC, which was working on roads, was on the VILLERS-PLOUICH TO MARCOING road when they warned that the enemy had broken through. The company returned to VILLERS-PLOUICH and Captain Sear reported to Divisional HQ, from whom he received instructions to take up a position on BORDERER RIDGE to prevent enemy from approaching VILLERS-PLOUICH from the direction of GOUZEAUCOURT. The company dug in under light shell and machine gun fire. The OC got in touch with Battalion HQ during the course of the afternoon. The company remained here the night of the 30th Nov/1st Dec. Touch was obtained with ‘A’ Company and Borderer Ridge about 3 PM. The CO was then informed by Captain Sear that Divisional HQ had remained at their HQ near VILLERS-PLOUICH. Casualties: 2 OR wounded.

Prelude to Cambrai November 1917

There was a level of more than usual secrecy about military activities during November 1917. It applied equally to the work of 11th DLI Pioneers. Their location was recorded as W.3.c.5.7 – a map reference. While most companies were working on roads and communications trenches, one company was allocated to creating new accommodation at Q.30.d. Transport and communications seemed to be the order of the day – roads, railways, trenches.

Rumours would have done their rounds no doubt, as something was clearly afoot. Perhaps there was a hint when Captain C Palmer was transferred permanently to the Tank Corps and Captain WGL Sear took his place in charge of ‘A’ Company. The unusual task on 9 November of constructing ‘a model in connection with the coming operations’ might also have fed the rumours. That job lasted several days, so it was a complex affair. Then Captains Sear and Jee were called away to a Conference at Albert, where no doubt they began to get some of what lay behind the secrecy.

As the month progressed (more roads, tracks, shelters and communications trenches), the battalion was gradually moved forward to occupy the village of Gouzeaucourt and shelters in the area around. The shelters were as much to keep out prying eyes from the sky than protection. 20th Division began its attack on 20 November and 11 DLI followed up by digging forward communications trenches from the British lines. The Lewis guns moved from anti-aircraft duty to join the forward infantry brigades. Casualties began to mount: Lt WW Inglis was killed while others were wounded. The relentless work on roads continued until the end of the month.

There is little in the diary accounts to suggest what was happening at the Front. The 20th Division Infantry Brigades, supported by tanks, had captured the village of La Vacquerie and held a crossing on the St Quentin Canal. This was merely one sector on the right-hand side of a concentrated push through the Hindenburg Line at Cambrai. There was a six-mile advance, but only into an exposed salient. The Germans quickly organised their artillery to bombard the area and had already gathered twenty Divisions for counter-attacks, some deployed to slow the British advance almost immediately. The tanks had proved their worth by suppressing what the Germans had regarded as impregnable wire defences and by sheer surprise.

On 30 November, ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies of 11 DLI were deployed in the Hindenburg Support Line, ‘A’ company was in shelters in a railway cutting at Villers Plouich, while HQ and ‘C’ Companies occupied shelters in a sunken road in Gouzeaucourt. Only from this day would the Pioneers demonstrate their true colours, well beyond what might be expected of ‘intelligent and organised labour’.